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RIGHT THINGS: ON THE QUESTION OF BEING AND LAW 
by 
PANU M INKKINEN* 
The event {Ere~gnisl  the law in so far as it gathers mortals into the 
appropriateness of their essence and there holds them. 1 
... the law is itselfa kind of place, a topos and a taking place. 2
The current contemplations in what is known as continental 
philosophy have, no doubt, had a profound influence on the contemporary 
study of law. One manifestation of this influence has been the attention 
given to issues related to law and justice in the works of, for example, 
Jacques Derrida or Emmanuel Ldvinas. The philosophical debate has also 
involved certain thinkers with a juridical background such as Giorgio 
Agamben among others. A further manifestation has been the influences 
of this philosophical debate on what we may- -  perhaps rather 
cautiously - -  term critical legal theory, especially in the Anglo-American 
world. 
A figure that persistently appears in this debate is Martin Heidegger. 
The position of Heidegger's fundamental ontology in philosophy proper is 
clear enough. 3 Very little has, however, been done to assess the 
* University of Helsinki, Finland. I wish to thank Piyel Haldar and Christopher 
Stanley for their valuable comments on a draft of section II-III of this essay 
and Jari Kauppinen for his expert advice on the enigmas of Heideggerian 
terminology. 
1 Martin Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache. Gesamtausgabe. Band 12 
(Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985), 248. 
2 Jacques Derrida, "Prdjugds. Devant la loi', in Jacques Derrida et al., La facultd 
dejuger (Paris: Minuit, 1985), 87-139, at 118. 
3 For a general introduction to Heidegger's fundamental ontology, see, e.g., 
Jacques Taminiaux, Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental Ontology 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991). 
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significance of Heidegger's philosophy for the study of law. It has, indeed, 
been argued that Heidegger radicalises the question of philosophy to such 
an extent that no philosophy of law is thereafter possible. As the 
philosophy of law does not and cannot address the question of Being, it 
can - -  so the argument runs - -  only reduce itself to legal theory. 4 In 
critical legal theory, Heidegger has made his way to the footnotes of 
academic scripture mainly through the influence of the aforementioned 
contemporary philosophers. But if we take in earnest Derrida's claim in, 
for example, "Ousia et gramme" about Heidegger's reluctance to take the 
destruction of Western metaphysics to its conclusion 5, it is even more 
debatable to embrace references to Heidegger in the study of law as facile 
and self-evident. 
Before the latest generation of ontological footnoting, Heidegger's 
philosophy has experienced at least two law-related assimilations. The 
first phase, originating in the 1950s, involves an existential reading of 
Heidegger and, in its legal applications, is strongly influenced by the 
social philosophy of Karl Jaspers 6, the existential theology of Max Miiller 7, 
and the existentialism ofJean-Paul Sartre s. The principal question of an 
existential philosophy of law is not Being but, rather, human existence 
and its rapport o the social dimension of law. The second assimilation 
that takes place during the next decade is the elaboration of an 
hermeneutic phenomenology of law which appropriates its Heideggerian 
undertow mainly from the philosophies of Hans-Georg Gadamer 9 and Paul 
Ricceur. 1° The principal question of this approach concerns the 
interpretation oftexts and has since developed into an established field of 
legal theory. The position of the latest phase, that is, critical egal theory, 
4 Rafael Guti~rrez Girardot, "Ist Rechtsphilosophie tiberhaupt m~glich?", Archiv 
fi~r Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, Beiheft Nr. 41 -- Neue Folge Nr. 4 (1965), 
155-162. 
5 Jacques Derrida, Marges --  de Ia philosophic (Paris: Minuit, 1972), 73-78. 
6 E.g. Karl Jaspers, Existenzphilosophie (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1956), 26-54. 
7 E.g. Max Mtiller, Existenzphilosophie irn geistigen Leben der Gegenwart 
(Heidelberg: F.H. Kerle, 1964), 160-183. 
8 E.g. Jean-Paul Sartre, L'~tre et te ndant. Essai d'ontologie phdnom~nologique 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1943), 275-364. 
9 E.g. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode. GrundziSge einer 
phitosophischen Hermenutik. Gesammelte Werke. Band I (Tiibingen: J.C.B. 
Mohr, 1986), 258-269. 
10 E.g. Paul Ricceur, Le conflit des interprdtations. Essais d'hermdneutique (Paris: 
Scull, 1969), 222-232. 
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is blurred not only in relation to Heidegger but also to its predecessors. 
Yet, the problematic question remains. What does Heidegger's 
philosophy have to offer the philosophy of law? May we simply elude the 
problem by stating that the claim about the impossibility of a philosophy 
of law after Heidegger is merely a strategically motivated cathedratic 
appeal for tradition? Is there any philosophically relevant relationship 
between the question of Being and law? 
Among the few attempts to conceive a fundamental ontology in 
relation to law is the work of Erik Wolf. n For Wolf, u an ontology of law is 
necessarily the ontology of right (Rechtsontologie), and its question 
addresses the relationship between right and Being: Is right? Does right 
exist? A preliminary answer to the Seinsfrage of right is offered by the 
various modes of ontic inquiry into right understood as a being 
(positivism, rationalism, voluntarism, and phenomenology) but, as the 
preliminary introduction of Sein und Zeit will indicate, ta an ontic inquiry 
is unable to attain the Dasein of right, that is, the specific way in which 
right appears for Dasein. The point of departure of the ontology of right 
is, then, the ontological difference, the inconvertibility of right Being 
(Rechtsein) and right understood as a being (Rechtseiende). Wolf claims 
that right is neither an inauthentic aspect of a being nor a deficient mode 
of Being. Its essence (Wesen) is not located in the domain of the public; it 
comes to be (wesen) in Being-with and Being-for which are the prerequi- 
sites of authentic Being-self. 14 Right is not merely available equipment 
11 Wolf was Heidegger's colleague during the strenuous years at Freiburg. As 
dean of the Faculty of Law during Heidegger's rectorship, e also shares with 
Heidegger a debatable re ation to the Nazi government before the Second 
World War. 
12 Erik Wolf, "Rechtsphilosophie', in Rechtsphilosophische Studien. Ausgewtihlte 
Schriften (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1972), 69-82, at 71-72. 
13 Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit. Gesamtausgabe Band 2 (Frankfurt am 
Main: Vittorio Klostormann, 1977), §§1-4 (hereafter SZ). In my references, I 
have indicated the paragraphs in question to facilitate cross-checking with 
international editions. Several English commentaries to Sein undZeit are also 
available. I have found some of Hubert Dreyfus' clarifications to the standard 
translations ofHeidegger's key notions well motivated and useful: see Being- 
in.the.World. A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division 1 
(Cambridge/London: The MIT Press, 1991). In other eferences to Heidegger, I 
have consulted the standard translations whenever they were available. In 
order to maintain a consistent English terminology, some alterations were, 
however, necessary. As for Wolf,I have had to rely on my own judgement. 
14 I hesitate to ranslate Wesen as essence and, thus, participate in a r duction of
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that Dasein manipulates isolated from other Dasein but, rather, 
assignment (Weisung ).15 
In this essay, we shall attempt to think the relationship between right 
and Being by way of "road marks" set out by Heidegger and Wolf. We 
shall commence with an hermeneutic phenomenology of law, with an 
understanding of legal norms as equipment Dasein uses while being 
concernfully absorbed in the world. We shall then proceed to the 
predication of law as right with what Heidegger calls an assertive sign. 
With such an account, we will be able to formulate what Wolf calls a 
regional ontology of right (What is right? How is right?). This will, 
however, indicate that, while asserting the right of law in a regional 
ontology, Dasein is still caught in the inauthenticity of fallenness. In 
order to assess the possibility of authenticity in Dasein's relation to right 
and the relationship between right and Being in general, we shall finally 
attempt a fundamental ontology of right, an analysis of right as the 
advening of Being, as the coming order that becomes all beings in the 
original temporality (Zeitlichkeit) of Being. 
H 
The starting point of an hermeneutic phenomenology of law is the way 
in which Dasein encounters individual beings while being absorbed in its 
everyday practical activities. As Dasein confronts the world concernfully, 
it does not come across senseless existents. For Dasein, beings appear in 
a meaningful way as purposive tools, as equipment (Zeug) that it 
manipulates in accordance with a specific in-order-to (Um-zu) that 
designates the tool. The in-order-to f an equipmental being is not its 
function but, rather, a referential totality interconnecting one being to 
another without which any one being would remain senseless for Dasein. 
(SZ, §15). As equipment, a being is, then, defined by its in-order-to, its 
15 
Wolfs ontology to naive essentialism. The old German verb wesen that is also 
frequently used by Heidegger has usually been translated as "to occur 
essentially" and %ocome to be and unfold". 
"In Greek, to assign [zuweisen] is nemein. Nomos is not only law but more 
originally the assignment [Zuweisung] contained in the dispensation ofBeing. 
Only the assignment is capable of conjoining man into Being. Only conjoining 
is capable of supporting and binding. Otherwise all law remains merely a 
fabrication of human reason". Martin Heidegger, W gmarken. Gesamtausgabe. 
Band 9 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976), 360-361. 
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purposiveness within a structural totality. For a being to make sense to 
Dasein, it must function within a context of meaningful activity that 
Heidegger calls involvement (Bewandtnis). In its purposive involvement 
with beings, Dasein encompasses a for-the-sake-of-which (Um-willen), a 
conclusive albeit non-intentional motivation for Dasein to use equipment. 
By using equipment, Dasein displays a particular knowledge about how 
they function within a totality, within a wherein (Worin) of available 
beings. 
As Dasein is concernfully involved in its everyday activities, it is not 
reflectively aware of the equipmental being used or the totalities that 
define it as a particular being but, nevertheless, displays a pre-theoretical 
familiarity with these merely by knowing how to use it. By using a 
shovel, a farmer digs a ditch into his field demonstrating, at the same 
time, a necessary understanding of agriculture and, yet, does not reflect 
on the shovel or farming in any theoretical way. But without such an 
understanding, the individual being "shovel" would remain senseless: 
"ditch", "soil", "irrigation", "cultivation", and so on. Heidegger calls the 
general phenomenon of Dasein being "always already" socialised into a 
world of meaningful beings Being-in-the-world (in-der-Welt-Sein). The 
fundamental characteristics of any given being are determined by its in- 
order-to, its use as equipment in relation to a particular for-the-sake-of- 
which. As Dasein uses an equipmental being in its everyday practical 
activities, the tool has a specific way of Being that Heidegger calls 
availableness ( Zuhandenheit). 16 
The particularities of legal tradition present obstacles in trying to 
conceptualise an example relevant o law. Legal thinking seldom regards 
law as operative xcept when it is violated against and, for reasons that 
shall be taken up later, this is a plausible solution to a certain extent. But 
law exists in the world of Dasein even when things are running smoothly: 
it secures safe passage within urban traffic, it sets standards for com- 
merce and trade, it directs social comportment within certain parameters, 
and so on. 
In such situations, Dasein encounters law as an equipmental being 
with a specific in-order-to and for-the-sake-of-which. An obvious parallel 
to the farmer and the shovel would, of course, be the professional lawyer 
using law as equipment in her work. The lawyer displays a pre- 
theoretical familiarity with law by, for example, recognising a document 
as a contract laden with legal significance without having to reflect on the 
16 SZ, §§12 and 15. 
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matter theoretically. At the same time, she must necessarily possess 
some understanding of a referential totality without which law would 
remain senseless to her: "commitment", obligation", "process", "settle- 
ment", and so on. In the case of the professional lawyer, law functions as 
a "normative yardstick" against which the legal character of social 
relations is measured. 17 Law is not, however, equipment restricted for the 
use of legal professionals. Regardless of the merits of the professional 
approach, it can hardly touch the surface of a being as complex as law. 
We shall attempt to think law as it is encountered by the non-professional 
Dasein. 
In its everyday activities, Dasein is involved with available law 
continuously without being reflectively aware of it. For Dasein, law 
functions as equipment with which Dasein directs its social comportment 
within the world; we do not pick pockets or threaten others with violence 
because, regardless of the contents of individual statutes protecting the 
property and personal integrity of others, we abide by the law. The 
fundamental characteristics of law are not, then, revealed exclusively in 
its professional use as a yardstick for measuring the legality of social 
relations as the bulk of legal theory contends but, rather, in the way in 
which Dasein encounters law in relation to its own comportment within 
the world. The referential totality of law, its in-order-to, is, in a sense, 
self-referential: if a shovel "is" in order to dig ditches, law "is" only to be 
abided by. Dasein abides by the law encompassing a specific for-the-sake- 
of-which: law designates Dasein a place or a position from which it 
attempts to maintain a meaningful world. Law standardises Dasein's 
comportment. 
A literal translation of the German expression for abiding by the law 
(das Gesetz einhalten) would read: to keep law as one, to keep it intact. 
The connotation is similar as in the English expression "to keep a 
promise" and other such idioms. We do not keep a promise because we 
abide by its dictates or direct our own behaviour in accordance with the 
contents of its normative authority but, rather, because we wish to secure 
the unity of the promise. Should we break the promise by refraining from 
an obligation, its unity would be in jeopardy. In a similar way, law seems 
to manifest a two-fold tension between the order of unity and the disorder 
of decay. On the one hand, law has become one and, by abiding by the 
17 On a phenomenological account of such an approach, see Paul Amselek, "La 
ph6nom6nologie et le droit', Archives de la philosophic du droit XVII (1972), 
185-259, at 200-228. 
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law, we uphold its integrity. Its originary structure is not one of unity 
but, rather, of conflict and chaos. On the other hand, law has an 
inclination to disintegrate back into chaos, to lose the unity that only our 
law-abiding comportment can maintain. Because of this inclination, we 
act, not to maintain ourselves in accordance with the law, but to keep law 
itself as one. 
The primordial mode of Being, for Dasein and for law appears in a 
way that does not involve any form of reflective awareness. What Dasein 
encounters i , quite simply, availableness: asan equipmental being, law is 
transparent and dissolves in such a way that Dasein is not aware of its 
characteristics. In order to be available, law must paradoxically withdraw 
from Dasein concernfully engaged in its practical activities. As law- 
abiding citizens, we are normally unaware of law that we keep intact by 
acting in a certain way; we pay for a paper at the newsstand without 
being reflectively aware that the unity of law requires us to do so. In a 
corresponding way, Dasein's own grasp of its law-abiding comportment is 
not inspection in the sense of a methodological stance in relation to a set 
purpose but circumspection, that is, purposive involvement "in the world" 
to which both Dasein and law belong; by paying for the paper, we are 
merely engaged within a world encompassing both us and law (SZ, §15). 
Dasein articulates its understanding of law by comporting within 
three consecutive totalities. Firstly, there is an equipmental totality 
(Zeugganze) of law including such interrelated equipment as, for example, 
"law", "norm", "rule", "principle", and so on. Secondly, there is a referen- 
tial totality (Verweisungsganzheit) of law which comprises the structural 
relations between the individual beings. Thirdly, there is an involvement 
totality (Bewandtnisganzheit) of law which adds Dasein's purposiveness, 
its concern to keep law intact, to the two former (SZ, §18). Structurally 
the involvement totality makes up what is known as the world or, in other 
words, significance (Bedeutsamkeit), the background against which law 
"always already" makes sense in the disclosure of Dasein and world. 
Should Dasein always be involved in its everyday activities in such a 
transparent way, it would never be able to account for the world in which 
it and its equipment dwell. The primordial mode of Being of Dasein and 
of law lies, however, in the way in which available law is used in absorbed 
coping, in the way in which Dasein is involved in keeping law intact. An 
awareness of the fundamental characteristics of law is only possible when 
it fails to perform in the way it usually does and becomes unavailable 
(Unzuhandenheit) unravelling all that it normally performs with. In such 
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a case, the world, that is, the specific way in which individual beings such 
as law and referential totalities are accessible to Dasein in a meaningful 
way, is discovered. Heidegger, however, denies that the fundamental 
characteristics of beings could be explained by referring to a subject/ 
object-relationship in which, for example, the subject intentionally 
theorises about law. is 
From the modes of disturbance defined by Heidegger (SZ, §16), we can 
distinguish three different ways in which law is unravelled to Dasein. 
Conspicuousness (Auff~lligkeit) is the brief acknowledgement that law has 
somehow not performed in the way it should. We pick up a paper from the 
newsstand and start to walk away suddenly remembering that we have 
not paid for it. The law that we are to keep intact by directing our 
comportment in a specific way suddenly becomes unavailable but, as we 
pay the attendant, quickly withdraws back into availableness. Obstinacy 
(Aufs~ssigkeit) occurs when the function of law, that is, that it is kept 
intact, becomes impossible. As we are looking for the attendant of the 
newsstand who has mysteriously vanished, we become more fully aware of 
law, of the requirement to keep it intact, and of the referential totality 
that encloses the requirement: "law", "payment", price", "merchandise", 
'%usiness', and so on. Only after reflective thinking can we secure the 
unity of law by, for example, leaving the coins at the counter and be on 
our way. In the third variant of disturbance, obtrusiveness (Aufdringl- 
ichkeit), a transition occurs from involved practic~ activity to a theoretical 
reflection of the impossibility to fulfil the task, that is, to keep law intact. 
Sitting in the underground with an unpaid paper under our arm and no 
possibility to rectify our infraction, we reflect on the matter with 
ambiguous sensations of unaccomplishment. We are fully aware that we 
have broken the law and are withheld from resuming our practical 
activity, that is, keeping law intact, and helplessly gaze at the paper we 
have unlawfully taken into our possession. Only now does a theoretical 
position enabling the explanation of the causal relations between law, 
commerce, and our own behaviour become possible but, at the same time, 
law has become occurrent (Vorhandenheit) and is deprived of its worldly 
18 According to Heidegger, the theoretical reflection of science requires the 
decontextualisation of aspects into occurrent properties that donot belong to 
the equipmental whole. For example, the efficacious aspect of law is 
decontextualised into ~'efficacy', anisolable property that can then be attached 
to any other entity, as well. In Heideggerian terms, this would mean 
"overlooking the equipmental character" of law. See SZ, §69b. 
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character and, accordingly, its fundamental characteristics. 
Ill 
As an hermeneutic of everydayness, the first division ofSein und Zeit 
attempts to define the proper "method" for the interpretation of Dasein's 
involvement with meaningful beings in its everyday practices. Heidegger 
claims that the tradition has overlooked Dasein's primordial relationship 
with the world and has, thus, evaded the question of Being: What "is", for 
example, law for Dasein? (SZ, §5) 
The hermeneutic interpretation (Auslegung) of law is already implicit 
in Dasein's everyday understanding of law. Interpretation is always the 
articulation of a latent capacity that Dasein usually exercises in its 
everyday purposive involvement: by keeping law intact, Dasein interprets 
law that it must necessarily already possess an understanding of. For 
Heidegger, interpretation is grounded on a threefold fore-structure of 
understanding. Firstly, Dasein must necessarily possess a fore-having 
(Vorhabe), understand the functional totality to which law belongs 
("norm", "rule", "position", "social world", and so on). In other words, in 
interpretation Dasein manifests its understanding of using law and other 
related equipment for a variety of purposes. Secondly, Dasein must 
possess a fore-seeing (Vorsicht), understand that, as serviceable 
equipment, law can be used to achieve a specific end. In other words, in 
interpretation Dasein displays its understanding of taw as a being that 
can be kept intact. Thirdly, Dasein must possess a fore-conception 
(Vorgriff), an understanding of how law must be manipulated in order to 
achieve this end. In other words, in interpretation Dasein anticipates that 
by comporting in a specific way it can keep law intact (SZ, §32). 
In designating us a place within the world - -  for example, that of a 
paying customer at the newsstand - -  law directs our comportment in a 
specific way. Dasein directs itself in relation to law due to a certain 
pressure present in its Being-with (Mit-sein) in the world with other 
Dasein. It occupies positions in relation to other Dasein in a way that is, 
so to speak, proper. Dasein directs itself towards a "normality" in the 
sense that, for example, paying for the paper is "what one does". This 
involves no normative pressure in the legal or moral senses; "one keeps 
law intact" (man hdilt das Gesetz ein) because that is what is expected of 
Dasein. For Heidegger, the "one" (das Man) of the passive modus is a non- 
ethical, formal description of Dasein's tendency to conform (SZ, §27). By 
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conforming to the normalising impetus of law, that is, by keeping law 
intact because that is what one usually does, Dasein avoids differentiation 
from others and aims at an averageness, a shared background necessary 
to sustain the world and, as a part of it, a place or position without which 
an understanding of individual beings would be impossible. Law-abiding 
Dasein is merely conforming to the normality of the one. Conforming, 
however, prevents Dasein access to its true Being. Therefore, Dasein's 
relation to the normalising impetus of law is supported by common 
normality. In other words, Dasein's mode of Being in relation to law can 
only be inauthentic (uneigentlich).19 
If Dasein keeps law intact, it is not merely conforming to a norm in 
order to designate itself a place within the world; Dasein does not relate to 
norms and law in the same way. Even if simple norms constitute the bulk 
of positive law, we do not write out an official document according to a 
prescribed formula in the same way as we pay for a paper at he 
newsstand. Unlike norms, law indicates to a norm that can be kept intact 
and, at the same time, specifies uch comportment as right (recht). We 
pay for a paper and, simultaneously, contend that it is right to do so. 
Moreover, law does not require actual use: law states that it is right to 
keep law intact. The unitary structure of law (Gesetz), its intactness, is
right (Recht). We must, accordingly, work out how Dasein accounts for 
the right of law. 
For Heidegger, there are beings that do not function merely as 
equipment that Dasein uses in its practical activity but that, at the same 
time, serve as indicators revealing their mode of Being and the referential 
context in which they function. Heidegger calls such beings signs 
(Zeichen). In its functioning, a sign points out the shared background in
relation to which Dasein understands it, that is, the world. 2° A legal sign 
proper such as, for example, a trademark is not merely a representational 
relationship between a name and a product. Like all beings, a trademark 
is equipment serviceable in differentiating one product from another but, 
19 In some interpretations of Heidegger, there is a disposition to understand 
"inauthenticity" as a pejorative mode of existence. This is,however, not the 
case. For the most part, Dasein's relationship with the world is inauthentic as 
in, for instance, coping with the everyday and, indeed, should remain so. 
20 This passage would require a more elaborate analysis ofHeidegger's critique of 
Edmund Husserl's conception of signs: Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter 
Band. Untersuchungen zur Ph~nomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis. I Teil 
(Tfibingen: Max Niemeyer, 1980), 23-61. I must, however, leave this for 
another occasion. 
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at the same time, it must necessarily be enclosed in an involvement 
totality in which the sign appears as meaningful for Dasein: "Levis@", 
"fashion", "distinction", and so on. In its functioning, a sign points out this 
totality. For Heidegger, then, a sign does not only point to any other being 
and is not a representational re ationship between the two. The working 
of signs, that is, their use in Dasein's everyday activity and their 
indicative function, presupposes a shared understanding of the world 
which the sign simultaneously reveals (SZ, §17). 
Wolf has argued that because right is ultimately connected to Dasein's 
authentic mode of Being, it cannot merely beavailable quipment such as 
law but, indeed, a signal, a meaningful sign that situates Dasein's 
comportment within a specific order. 21 As sign, right services Dasein as 
an indicator that points out the significative background against which 
law appears as meaningful to Dasein. The sign ~it is right to keep law 
intact" or, in short, '~law is right" is equipment the in-order-to f which is 
the communication f Dasein's understanding of law as right. The for-the- 
sake-of-which of right is the specification of the place within the world 
designated to Dasein in keeping law intact as right, that is, the 
structuring of Dasein's lawful existence into a rightful order. 
The attribute of right that the sign predicates to law has, however, no 
specific function in itself. If right is not serviceable as equipment, how 
can Dasein understand, interpret, or use it? Understanding right, that is, 
the second step of our thinking, is understanding law as right. For 
Heidegger, any such understanding is articulated in an assertion 
(Aussage). An assertion is a specific mode of sign with which Dasein 
assigns predicates to beings. Even though predicates uch as natural 
attributes are not in themselves erviceable as equipment, assertive 
understanding that, for example, "law is right" is interpretation that must 
necessarily be rooted in Dasein's everyday understanding of the world. 
Understanding the right of law requires the use of a sign as equipment 
that asserts that law is right (SZ, §33). 
Dasein articulates the meaning (Sinn) of the assertion by using it, 
that is, by asserting that law is right. The meaning of an assertion is, 
however, not understood as semantic signification. It is, quite simply, 
that the being in question is, indeed, the given assertion or, in our case, an 
assertion that can be used as equipment to designate that law is right. A 
"false" interpretation of an assertion is, then, to use the equipment 
incorrectly. With assertions, Dasein can, for example, allude to the 
21 Wolf, supra m12, at 72. 
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binding character of law, its essence as power, and so on, but this is not 
the meaning of the assertion "law is right". Assertions uch as "law is 
binding", '1aw is power", or ~law is just" have meanings in their own right 
but cannot contest he meaning of"law is right ~ (SZ, §32). 
By asserting that law is right, Dasein points out law without having 
to use it as conventional equipment. The possibility of using is, 
nevertheless, always latent. "Law is right" alleges that law is serviceable 
as equipment. The assertion indicates that it is right to keep law intact 
by paying for the paper at the newsstand even when we are not involved 
in the practice of purchasing one. Dasein indicates or points out law 
without actually using it for its designated purpose, that is, keeping it 
intact. The assertion does, however, communicate he understanding that 
in order to achieve tlfis purpose, we must use law in the "right" way. 
Through assertions, Dasein shares its understanding of the world in 
which it dwells with other Dasein. This communicative function of 
assertive signs can be analyzed using the same practical framework as 
with other serviceable beings that Dasein uses. 
"Law is right" is, however, not a theoretical assertion attaching the 
isolated, occurrent property of "rightness" to law isolated from Dasein's 
practical involvement in the world. An assertion is a derivative mode of 
interpretation that presupposes an actual or possible disturbance in 
Dasein's purposive comportment. By merely keeping law intact, Dasein is 
unable to designate itself the place that is rightfully its own. The order of 
law remains "unright', and to overcome this disturbance, Dasein asserts 
that law must be kept intact in a specific way, it must be upheld within a 
specific order. Only if it is right to keep law intact or, in other terms, only 
if law is kept intact in the right, can Dasein realise its purposive 
involvement within the referential whole of law. In plain terms, only 
right law is law. 
"Law is right" functions within the general structure of assertions in 
three ways (SZ, §33). Firstly, it indicates to or points out (Aufzeigung) a 
shared context or a referential totality in which law appears as 
meaningful for Dasein. This pointing-out is, however, motivated. Law 
embraces a deficiency that obstructs Dasein in achieving what it was set 
out to accomplish. We can keep law intact by, for instance, paying for the 
paper merely out of generosity or fear of punishment. Only if we pay in a 
"right" way can the transaction involve law and achieve the purpose we 
were set out to accomplish, that is, keep law intact in the right. In 
Heidegger's terms, assertions make manifest a shared problem. 
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Secondly, the assertion singles out law from a nexus of available 
equipment and, through predication (Prddikation), indicates to a specific 
aspect: in order for law to be law, that is, to be serviceable to Dasein as 
law, it must be right. In its primordial mode of Being, Dasein encounters 
law as available equipment. In order to function properly, law must, 
however, possess certain qualities or aspects that can, at will, be pointed 
out with assertions. Just  as a shovel must possess certain aspects of 
solidity and endurance in order to function properly in the digging of 
ditches, law must be right. We may, for instance, also pay for the paper 
because law is binding, but with the assertion wewish to differentiate one 
specific aspect, right, that makes law what it is. In other words, law can 
exist with or without binding power but not without right. 
Thirdly, the assertion functions as communication (Mitteilung) within 
Dasein's purposive involvement in the world sharing a Being-towards 
(Sein-zu) in relation to what has been pointed out and predicated. Buying 
papers at the newsstand, an activity any Dasein can take up, involves a 
specific law-related obstacle that we have first specified and now wish to 
communicate. 
IV 
Can Dasein, then, understand right independently as an occurrent 
property isolated from the everyday use of law? In other words, can 
Dasein decontextualise law from its practical involvement in the world, 
postulate context-free properties uch as "rightness", and thematise all 
this into, for example, a theory of law? Heidegger's answer is, of course, 
yes. Dasein can thematise its world with occurrent properties, but even 
such thematisation must necessarily take place in a shared world that 
"always already" precedes theoretical reflection; theory is an impoverished 
form of hermeneutic nterpretation. Occurrentness is perceivable but, for 
Heidegger, intentional states such as perception must necessarily also 
involve Dasein's practical understanding ofthe world. To perceive right is 
to perceive that something is right. Therefore, Dasein's understanding of
right is necessarily dependent on the use of an assertion that predicates 
right to law. 
Our thinking has led us to the following understanding of right: as 
law, right locates Dasein into the world, and this location is structured 
within an order. Right is localising (Ortung, ~thos) and ordering 
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(Ordnung, ethos). ~ But even such an hermeneutic interpretation of right 
does not involve authentic Being-in-the-world. We Iocalise and order 
ourselves because that is what one does. Dasein is still caught in the 
inauthenticity of fallenness. As true Being is still unattainable for 
Dasein, most Heideggerian analyses of right attempt o proceed into an 
existential philosophy of right. 
For instance, Erich Fechner argues that law serves Dasein as 
equipment by furnishing uidance, security, and peace within the social 
sphere; it protects Dasein by granting, in the order it fosters, a relative 
protection against he insecure and volatile nature of life. But if we 
understand law as'right, it must necessarily engage something more, a 
supplement that goes beyond the tool-world of everyday life. Fechner 
equates right with Heidegger's notion of logos (SZ, §34) and argues that, 
as language, right's mode of Being is that of Dasein itself (Daseinsm~flig). 
Therefore, we are not dealing merely with Dasein losing itself in the 
inauthenticity ofthe everyday but with true human existence. Hence an 
existential philosophy of right. 23 In a more or less similar vein, Werner 
Maihofer contends that right belongs to Dasein's social existence and 
concludes that such existence cannot be confined to Being-self. Right is 
ultimately bound to Dasein's Being-as (ats-Sein) in the world. Dasein 
exists in the social world in relation to other Dasein "as" someone with 
specific obligations and rights: as citizen, as father, as merchant, and so 
on. u 
22 According to Carl Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde im V61kerrecht des Jus 
Publicum Europaeum (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1988), 13, land is 
mythologically the mother of right, the root of right and justice. The fruit of 
the cultivated land is the divine justice every farmer acknowledges; the tillage 
marks the yardsticks and rules of agriculture; the divisions of land make the 
localisation (Ortung) and the order (Ordnung) of communal life public: "Right 
is bound to land and covered by it. This is what the poet means when he 
speaks of the allrighteous land and says: justissima tellus." 
23 Erich Fechner, Rechtsphilosophie. Soziologie und Metaphysik des Rechts 
(Tfibingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1956), 229-231. This is the usual way of reading 
Heidegger within the philosophy of law: as existential philosophy. Later (at 
254-255) Fechner contends that Heidegger's whole v~uvre is "nothing less than 
nihilism". See also Charles Donius, "Existentialisme, ph~nom~nologie et 
philosophie du droit', Archives de la philosophie du droit IV (1957), 221-231. 
On Heidegger and social philosophy, see also Leopold Rosenmayr, 
"Gesellschaftsbild und Kulturkritik Martin Heideggers", Archiv fi~r Rechts- 
und Sozialphilosophie XLVI (1960), 1-38. 
24 Werner Maihofer, Vom Sinn menschlicher Ordnung (Frankfurt am Main: 
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Regardless of i ts sources of inspirat ion,  an existent ial  phi losophy of 
right, however, reduces the radical i ty of Heidegger's fundamental  ontology 
into an anthropology, into an account of the human condition as social 
existence. The question of Being and its relat ion to r ight remain  open. 
One possible way to address  this quest ion would be to draw upon 
Heidegger 's  read ing of the so cal led Anax imander  f ragment  and the 
interpretat ion ofdik~ as order (Fug).~ Wolf gives his own interpretat ion 
of the f ragment in his work on Greek legal th inking acknowledging his 
debt to Heidegger. 26 Before an ana lys is  on Wel l s  in terpretat ion  is 
possible, we must  del iberate on his involvement with Heidegger and the 
Greeks in genera lY  
25 
26 
27 
Vittorio Ktostermann, 1956), 42-52. See also Werner Maihofer, Recht und 
Sein. Prolegomena zu einer Rechtsontologie (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1954) and Allessandro Baratta, Philosophie und Strafrecht 
(KSln/Berlin]Bonn/Miinchen: Carl Heymanns, 1985), 113-131. 
Martin Heidegger, Holzwege. Gesamtausgabe. Band 5 (Frankfurt am Main: 
Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), 321-373. See also Martin Heidegger, HOlderlins 
Hymnen "Germanien" und "Der Rhein". Gesamtausgabe. Band 39 (Frankfurt 
am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1980), 123-129, 135-140; Martin Heidegger, 
Einfi~hrung in die Metaphysik. Gesamtausgabe. Band 40 (Frankfurt am Main: 
Vittorio Klostermann, 1983), 167-170 and 174-176. 
The translation given in Holzwege was not yet available. E. Wolf, Griechisches 
Rechtsdenken I. Vorsokratiker und fri~he Dichter (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1950), 218, refers to Heidegger's Freiburg lectures from 1941, 
where Heidegger insists that the fragment speaks of Being and Being alone 
thus, once again, excluding all juridico-moral interpretations. Martin 
Heidegger, Grundbegriffe. Gesamtausgabe. Band 51 (Frankfurt am Main: 
Vittorio Klostermann, 1981), 99. 
Within critical egal theory, there is a clear temptation - - perhaps triggered by 
Derrida's recent interpretation of Heidegger's reading of the fragment 
(Spectres de Marx [Paris: Galilee, 1993], 49-57) - -  to read dik~ as ajuridico- 
moral metaphysics ofjustice. In my mind, this would, however, repeat he 
anthropological error of existential readings of Heidegger: Dasein as human 
Being is understood as the social existence of the z~on politikon. "If we 
translate dik~ as 'justice' and understand it in a juridico-moral way, the word 
loses its grounding metaphysical content". Heidegger (Einf~hrung ... ), supra 
n.25, at 169. For similar reasons, I find Bernasconi's "ethical" assessment of
dik~ and justice (Gerechtigkeit) in Heidegger captivating and, yet, paradoxical. 
See Robert Bernasceni, "Justice and the Twilight Zone of Morality", in 
Heidegger in Question. The Art of Existing (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 
1993), 40-55. 
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Wolf ~ founds his fundamental ontology of right on two short citations 
from early Heidegger. The first is from Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche's 
affirmation on the death of God in Holzwege, and Wolf contends that the 
following passage includes Heidegger's determination ofjustice: "The just 
is that which is in conformity with the right; but what is r ight  is 
determined out of that which, as whatever is, is in being [was als Seiendes 
seiend ist]". 29 A few lines above the quoted passage, Heidegger reminds 
that, for Nietzsche, justice is not primarily the determination of the 
ethical and juridical domains. The thinking of justice and r ight 
commences from the Being of beings. 8° With the determination ofright in 
the Being of beings, Wolf couples Heidegger's notion of the necessary 
relationship between truth and Dasein: "There is' [es gibt] Being - -  not 
beings - -  only in sofar as truth is. And t ruth /s  only in sofar as and as 
long as Dasein is. Being and truth 'are' equiprimordial'.31 
From these passages, Wolf concludes that the truth of right can only 
be revealed in its mode of Being (Rechtsdasein). The truth of right as a 
being is the true justness that is determined in accordance with right. 
Right, on the other hand, is determined from the right-beingness of right 
understood as a being which is, finally, determined from Being. Wolf 
insists that these sentences are neither circular nor elements ofa chain of 
rational thought but, rather, road marks that assign the direction of 
thinking. 
Wolf's reading of pre-Socratic legal thinking involves three questions. 
The philosophical question addresses the dialectical unity of historicality 
(Geschichtlichkeit) and truth; the poetic question addresses the way in 
which poetry brings something of the essence of truth into the clearing; 
finally, the historical question addresses how this revelation has been 
brought to its conclusion in an original and compelling way in the 
thinking and the poetising of the early Greeks. According to Wolf, a 
disciplined historical inquiry is but escape from the present whereas 
historicality is the essence of the ever-present spirit. As right exists 
historically in the way of a spiritual Dasein and, as part of history, is only 
comprehensible as spirit, the essence of right is its historicality. Spirit 
can be and become only what it originally was. The essence that appears 
28 Wolf, supra n.12, at 72. 
29 Heidegger (Holzwege), supra n.25, at 247. 
30 Cf. Reiner Schfirmann, Le principe d'anarchie. Heidegger et la question de 
l'agir (Paris: Seuil, 1982), 233-236. 
31 SZ, §44, at 304. 
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as right is the same at any given moment in history and must be 
comprehended asmeaningful in relation to Being-with-another and Being- 
for-another. For Wolf, history is not, then, what has come about but what 
comes to be. This takes place in the event (Ereignis), the ever-present, the 
eternal Being of ephemeral beings. 32 
For Wolf, the cultural value of Antiquity is social and ethical in the 
sense that it involves an obligation to regard the essential and to waive 
the arbitrary. This obligation concerns primarily the duties of everyday 
Dasein of which one is the protection and the attendance of right. Wolf 
responds to this obligation by observing what the early Greeks brought 
into the clearing as the essence of right. The image of Antiquity so 
observed is the origin (arch,), the uncovering of the lasting and primordial 
essence in which pre-Christian man became herself in her encounter with 
the gods and the cosmos. In the spiritual world of the early Greeks, the 
human spirit comes to be in its historical truth. The historical unity of the 
spiritual attempts to convey the essence of Being-in-the-world into 
appearance are determined from historical Dasein and indicate back to it. 
For Wolf, the determination ofthe historical truth of Being-in-the-world in 
the thinking and the poetising of pre-Socratic Greece necessarily precedes 
any Platonic or Aristotelian understanding ofright as an idea or category; 
truth (al~theia) is the primordial uncovering of right Being. ~ 
Wolfs fundamental ontology of right is mainly built on three words 
which he reads and interprets from Homeric poetry. Firstly, themistes i
the ordering aspect of right; it is the rectifying or corrective assignment 
with which the gods or their human envoys address Dasein's world. 34 
Secondly, the order so stipulated is themis: "so gilt es', "it is so ordered". 
This does not concern the social sphere of human existence - -  themis is 
neither natural law nor political o rder -  but is an assertion on Dasein 
that is ~in the right". To exist within the order of themis is essential 
Being, to be '~n the right" as that what it is. ~ Thirdly, dik~ is neither law 
nor rule as it is usually translated. It is appeal and solicitation, the 
demand for and the allotment of essential Being as that which comes to be 
(Zukommende). Dik~ is, then, the coming into the order of themis in the 
assignment ofthemistes. ~ 
32 Wolf, supra n.26, at 9-12. 
33 /b/d, 14-18. 
34 /b/d., 72-76. 
35 /b/d, 76-84. 
36 /b/d., 107-112. 
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The verb zukommen on which Wolf structures his interpretation of
dikO indicates how right is related to the temporality of Being. The 
temporal mode of right is the future (Zukunft), the ~ venir, the advening 
or the coming into Being of beings. Heidegger interprets dik~ as the order 
of Being; for Wolf, however, it is the right of Being. To be "in the right" is 
the advening of the Being of all beings, their coming into Being. Beings 
cannot be thought without dik~ ; the rightless is the unessential, that is, 
not coming into Being. Hence the following translation of the fragment: 
"But from where all beings ascend, there, too, their descent takes place; 
according to their necessary need [Not]. From themselves all beings allot 
one another that which essentially advenes them [das ihm wesentlich 
Zukommende ] ... in accordance with the time that it is bestowed at each 
moment". ~7 
In an encyclopaedia entrance on the philosophy of law from 1961, Wolf 
attempts to gather together his notion of right as the advening of Being. 3s 
This short and ense passage commences with the statement that right 
beings exist (es gibt, il y a) in the world (h~ gar dik~ esti). Right beings 
that in truth are also just. Such beings are right things (rechte Dinge, ta 
dikaia). To be truthfully just, beings must be in accordance with right 
(kata to dikaion), they must be correct or appropriate. As a being, right is, 
then, the predicate in accordance with which beings are in truth just, that 
is, right (to dikaion). The rectitious (ho dikaios) responds to right by 
predictating (entsprechen) and, thus, edicts (aussprechen) i  articulation 
the beingness of right (ho logos dikanikos), and this takes place in the 
right word (dikaios logos). Therefore, the responsive predicating is what 
is in accordance with right (to dikaibma), and accordance with right (h~ 
dikaiot~s) determines everything that is just in right. 
If right is determined from Being, then Being advenes right. In other 
words, right will come to be (h~ dike). What comes into Being in the 
advening is sameness (to heauton), and the sameness that advenes all 
beings exists as the temporal mode of to be advenient (dikaiSs), to be 
coming into Being. In this temporality, all beings are in the right 
(endikos). Therefore, advenient beings are the truthfully advening or, in 
other words, right (to dikaion). The adverting takes place in righteous 
honesty (dikaiosun~) which is edicted in articulation as seemly telling (ta 
dikaia legein). From this, Wolf concludes that what necessarily advenes 
right is the ultimate advenient ( o dikaiotaton). 
37 Ibid., 234. 
38 Wolf, supra n.12, at 72-73. 
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The advening is, simultaneously, the prevening (entkommen) of the 
other (to adikon), and the non-advenient (h~ adikia) takes place in letting 
the advening be prevened (adikein) with a non-righter (adikos). On the 
other hand, the advening will be received (dikOn dounai) by letting the 
advening advene (dik~n didonai). Everything advening will be 
established firmly (themisteuein)  the responsive predictation of correct- 
ive speech (themiton). The firmly established (thesmos) is the ground from 
which all corrective judgements (themistes) addict (zusprechen) or grant 
the advening in responsive predictation. It  is the grounding (arch,), the 
joining (tuchg), and the binding (anagk~) of right Being (themis einai). 
V 
As far as right is concerned, Wolf seems to combine two different 
aspects in Heidegger's philosophy. On the one hand, he seems to agree 
with Heidegger's interpretation i which dik~ translates into order (Fug), 
but continues to make a reservation: 
...although it [PM: Heidegger's translation] t uches upon the essential of the 
matter, it does not say clearly enough what dik~ "joins", namely the allotment 
of the advening, the claim to the advening, and the advening as each's own 
future itself. ~ 
In Heidegger, the verb zukommen employed by Wolf throughout his 
fundamental ontology of right can be found in the Marburg lectures on 
temporality from 1927. Of the three ekstasis of original temporality 
(Zeitlichkeit), Heidegger gives priority to the future: 
The Dasein understands itself by way of its own most peculiar capacity to be 
[Seink6nnen], ofwhich it is expectant. In thus comporting toward its own 
most peculiar capacity to be, it is ahead of itself. Expecting a possibility, I 
come from this possibility toward that which I myself am. The Dasein, 
expecting its ability to be, comes toward itself. In this coming-toward-itself 
[Auf-sich-zukommen ], the Dasein is futural [zukiinftig] in an original sense. 4o 
Wolfs fundamental ontology of right is, no doubt, prone to the critique of 
39 Wolf, supra n.26, at 288. Here Wolf refers to Heidegger's Freiburg lectures on 
Parmenides from 1942/1943. See M. Heidegger, Parmenides. Gesamtausgabe. 
Band 53 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermarm, 1982), 135-140. 
40 M. Heidegger, Die Grundprobteme d r Phiinomenologie. Gesamtausgabe. Band 
24 (Frnakfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975), 374-375. Cf SZ, §65, at 
436: "The primary phenomenon foriginal and authentic temporality is the 
future." 
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deconstructive r adings on many levels. In addition to the more or less 
obvious pitfalls, that is, the archaeology of Greek origins, the hantology of 
the spiritual Dasein, and so on, Wolf cannot purge himself rom the double 
bind of right and Being. Instead of continuing his analysis by way of 
elaborating on the relationship between right and original temporality, he 
seems to retreat anticipating the consequences of Heideggerian 
destruction. 
For Wolf, then, dik~ as the advening is not only right Being but also 
the right to Being of all beings. Such a right can only be thought from a 
juridico-moral metaphysics that precedes and determines the foundations 
of the Seinsfrage. The interplay between the right of Being and the pre- 
ontological right to Being suggest a translation of Zukommende asdue 
rather than advening. Being is not only due as the temporality of 
advening but also as the advent that occurs and recurs according to 
rightful necessity. Being which is the due of beings reaffirms the onto- 
theological ground that a fundamental ontology of right was set to 
destruct. 
Is, then, a philosophy of law after Heidegger possible? Perhaps aware 
of the strained paradoxes in his affiliation with Heidegger, Wolf dedicates 
his later years to theological issues related to law. His writings on justice 
and the other as the neighbour, inspired by the theology of Karl Barth, 41 
resonate curiously with much of what is currently done in critical legal 
theory on law and L~vinas. The danger that lies in such undertakings i
that ethics and justice are understood merely as a haven of retreat, a 
withdrawal from the fundamental questions about the possibility and 
impossibility of law and right. This is why the use of the predicate 
"critical" deserves caution. 
41 E.g. Erik Wolf, Recht des N~chsten. Ein rechtstheologischer Entwurf 
(Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1958). 
